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Ralph James Savarese and Lisa Zunshine
The Critic as Neurocosmopolite; 
Or, What Cognitive Approaches to 
Literature Can Learn from 
Disability Studies: Lisa Zunshine  
in Conversation with Ralph James 
Savarese
This conversation began at MLA in 2012 when we recognized that cognitive  ap-
proaches to literature and disability studies, two rapidly and independently develop-
ing fields, must start talking to one another. The subject is autism: how it has been 
divergently understood and deployed and how it can be convergently understood 
and deployed. Kept apart, the two fields seem vulnerable to caricature. The former 
sometimes applies scientific and medical insights uncritically (such as the assertion 
that autistics have no theory of mind and, thus, cannot read fiction); the latter some-
times advances a completely social-constructionist understanding of physiological 
distinction (as if stigma were the entire story of alternative embodiment). Scholars in 
cognitive approaches to literature need the insights of disability studies to think about 
mind, narrative, and agency in neurodiverse ways; scholars in disability studies need 
the insights of cognitive approaches to literature to give the concept of neurodiversity, 
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which is quickly becoming a kind of platitude, some actual neuroscientific content. 
Talking across conventional disciplinary divides has precipitated questions that we 
would never have thought to ask. It has also made us hope that an ongoing conversa-
tion between cognitive approaches to literature and disability studies will transform 
both fields. We cannot foresee the exact shape of this transformation, but the formerly 
distinct trajectories already feel more intertwined.
A Postcolonial Neurology
Lisa Zunshine (LZ): In her recent contribution to Disability Studies Quarterly, Paula 
C. Durbin-Westby, an autistic disability rights activist, builds on Gayatri Chakra-
vorty Spivak’s “Can the Subaltern Speak?” to stress the importance of the “inclu-
sion of autistics as active collaborators in research, rather than mere research 
subjects to be studied and then written about, often in language that many autis-
tic people find demeaning. We must insist,” she writes, “on being ‘speaking sub-
jects,’ with our participation and input used in meaningful ways, rather than be-
ing ‘spoken subjects,’ a position which can lead to misinterpretation of research 
results and to uninformed experiments.” Would you comment on the ramifica-
tions of this practice of adapting the rhetoric of postcolonial studies to disability 
studies?
Ralph James Savarese (RJS): The postcolonial analogy can be traced back to a num-
ber of scholars, including Arthur Frank, who in The Wounded Storyteller likens 
medical patients to colonized peoples: the former’s bodies have been rational-
ly conquered and their indigenous experience of illness or disability has been 
haughtily disregarded. In its place, an official narrative, in something like a for-
eign language, has prevailed, leaving patients feeling both alienated and disem-
powered. But over the last thirty years or so, patients, like postcolonial subjects, 
have begun to write back to this kind of empire. According to Frank, “Postco-
lonialism in its most generalized form is the demand to speak rather than to 
be spoken for . . . or, in the worst cases, rather than being effaced entirely” (13). 
The rhetoric of postcolonial studies thus helps us to think about the historical 
circumstances of the neurological other: the subaltern has not only learned to 
speak, it has also begun to organize, as the neurodiversity movement and orga-
nizations such as the Autistic Self-Advocacy Network make clear. Insisting on 
the right to self-determination and advancing a notion of autism as neurological 
difference, not pathology, ASAN has agitated for progress on a range of issues: 
from better education, employment, and housing opportunities to better, more 
respectful medical care and scientific research.
  The difference between the privileged outsider view and the newly empow-
ered insider one is, however, considerable, and because the scientific community 
often has trouble with what autistic writer Dawn Prince calls “the superior part 
of speaking” (“The Silence Between”)—namely, listening—it continues to cause 
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damage. Think, for instance, of the common claim that autistics don’t experience 
empathy, which popular novels such as The Curious incident of the Dog in the 
Nighttime have only further promulgated. This claim is prevalent in the many 
fields that make up cognitive aesthetics.1 If one actually listens to autistics, one 
hears a different story. Stephen Shore, for example, distinguishes between being 
able to feel the pain of another, which he does so well that he almost “fuses” with 
it, and being able to perform this venerated emotion in a conspicuously neuro-
typical manner.2 By moving too quickly from a failure to normatively perform 
empathy to a sweeping contention about innate empathetic inadequacy, experts 
have not only disseminated faulty science about autism but they have also deni-
grated the subjectivity of a minority population.
  And yet, some scientists do seek the input of autistics in their research en-
deavors and actively adopt a postcolonial perspective. At the University of Mon-
treal, Laurent Mottron has assembled a neurodiverse team, believing autistic 
participation essential for doing first-rate science on autism. One of the autistic 
researchers, Michelle Dawson, served as the lead author for a groundbreaking 
study, “The Level and Nature of Autistic Intelligence,” which showed that the rate 
of mental retardation in the autistic population was much lower than previously 
thought.3 Other studies by the team have established the presence of perceptual 
acuities, 3-D drawing and pattern-recognition skills, simultaneous global and 
local processing strengths, and enhanced pure-tone pitch discrimination, lead-
ing Mottron to remark that autistics are “just of another kind” (Wolman).
  In general, autistics evince comparatively more activity in the temporal, oc-
cipital, and parietal regions and less activity in the frontal cortex than nonautis-
tics. As a recent meta-analysis by Mottron’s team reports, “A stronger engagement 
of sensory processing mechanisms . . . may facilitate an atypically prominent role 
for perceptual mechanisms in supporting cognition” (Samson et al. 1553). Au-
tistics, in other words, disproportionately recruit lower-order regions for high-
er-order tasks—Temple Grandin has famously called this tendency “thinking 
in pictures.” In Mottron’s model of “enhanced perceptual functioning,” autism 
“is more accurately described as an entirely different processing system, rather 
than as a collection of negative cascade effects resulting from one or many major 
impairments (excesses or deficits) . . .” (Mottron, Dawson, and Soulieres 1385). 
Such a perspective understands each neurotype as a particular set of cognitive 
strengths and weaknesses, and it explores the extent to which a given task might 
be performed in divergent ways.4
  But let me extend the postcolonial analogy a bit further by mentioning a term 
I have coined for the spirit behind such collaboration. The term is neurocosmo-
politanism, and I first used it in an essay about Tito Mukhopadhyay, a twenty-
five-year-old writer whom the medical community would describe as “severely 
autistic” and someone I have been mentoring for the last half-decade. In my essay 
about his work—he has published four books, the first at age eleven—I referred 
to Mukhopadhyay as a “cross-cultural, cross-sensorial migrant: a neurocosmop-
olite armed with metaphor in a world quite hostile to the neurological other” 
(“Toward a Postcolonial” 276). I wanted to evoke the strenuous journeying of 
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classical autistics, a group that Oliver Sacks once derided as “creatures for whom 
very little future lies in store” (246). I wanted to emphasize their efforts in learn-
ing the cognitive and cultural habits of neurotypicals, and I implicitly called for 
an equivalent commitment on the part of the neuromajority.
  If cosmopolitanism is the idea of a trans-national community, the feeling of 
being respectfully at home everywhere in the world, then neurocosmopolitan-
ism is the idea of a trans-neurocommunity, the feeling of being respectfully at 
home with all manner of neurologies. By “neurocosmopolitan” I mean not just 
an openness to neurological difference but, rather, a denaturalization, even a de-
thronement, of privileged neurotypicality. In Postcolonial Melancholia, Paul Gil-
roy advocates “methodic[ally] cultivati[ng] . . . a degree of estrangement from 
one’s own culture and history” (67) so as to forestall unfavorable judgments 
about the Other. Traveling to autism, we must do the same. By “neurocosmopoli-
tan” I mean as well the effect on autistics of the journeying I mentioned—what 
might be termed neurohybridity or mobility.
  We can see such journeying in a passage from Mukhopadhyay’s third book, 
How Can i talk if My Lips Don’t Move? In it he reveals not only his prosopagnosia 
and synesthesia but also his complex adaptation to these differences—both as a 
person and as a writer:
In the beginning, Deepa’s presence was just the sound of her voice, 
which tasted like a tamarind pickle. As days passed, her presence became 
a peacock blue, dipped in the taste of tamarind pickle. A month later . . . 
I began to feel confident enough to look at her . . . perfect beautiful face, 
which I . . . [now] feel honored to dream about, even though I am . . . 
many thousand miles away in the United States. (110)
 Once Mukhopadhyay has grown used to a face, he often has trouble recalling it, 
however; as a result, he purposely stores faces as idiosyncratic symbols. For ex-
ample, his teacher’s face in Austin “is represented as a yellow plastic bowl with a 
wide circumference” (111).
  Here, the need to circumvent neurological incapacity paradoxically facilitates 
the production of figurative language. Disability, we might say, found the ac-
commodation of creative writing, which in turn drew Mukhopadhyay ever more 
deeply into the social—to the extent that he can now expertly address and cap-
tivate an audience. So significant are his sensory integration, proprioception, fa-
cial-recognition, and memory challenges that his writing seems a marvel of aes-
thetic defamiliarization—and it is! “Every time I have to hear Mr. Blake’s voice, I 
recognize it by a squished tomato smell. After that, I know that there ought to be 
Mr. Blake somewhere around carrying his voice with him” (R. Savarese, “More 
Than a Thing”). One thinks of Arthur Rimbaud’s description of poetry as: “a 
systematic derangement of the senses.” By learning to translate the experience of 
alternative embodiment into evocative language and by acquainting himself with 
a range of world literatures, Mukhopadhyay has become an admirable literary 
neurocosmopolite.
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  What if scholars in the field of cognitive approaches to literature engaged 
with autism as neurocosmopolitan possibility? What might they learn, for ex-
ample, about narrative? Visually impaired writers have taught disability studies 
scholars just how optocentric conventional narrative is. Once typical vision and 
its influence on narrative practice have been deposed, a very different organism 
appears on the page. For instance, a book like Stephen Kuusisto’s eavesdropping: 
a Memoir of Blindness and Listening reveals the strangest of narrative worlds. 
Might the sensory dislocations of autism do the same for cognitive scholars? A 
postcolonial neurology can tell us much about literary forms while also modeling 
a dynamic and mutually transformative embrace of difference.
Mindblindness and Essentialism
LZ: Let’s talk about theory of mind, also known as mindreading, that is, the evolved 
cognitive adaptation that prompts us to explain observable behavior as caused 
by unobservable mental states, such as thoughts, feelings, and intentions. Cogni-
tive-psychological studies in theory of mind have provided useful research tools 
for literary critics whose research interests range from emotion and empathy to 
narrative theory and history of imagination. Yet in exploring how theory of mind 
structures cultural representations, one should not lose sight of the dark side of 
mindreading. Because mindreading is not telepathy but merely a far-from-per-
fect adaptation (they might as well have called it mind misreading), more often 
than not it actually limits our perception and interpretation and lures us into 
insidious cognitive traps. For instance, it is vulnerable to essentialist thinking 
(e.g., just consider how easy it is for us to slide into believing that the capacity for 
complex mental states is what makes us “essentially” human),5 and as such can 
be used as an effective “trope of dehumanization” (Vermeule 87). Blakey Ver-
meule has described the phenomenon of “literary mind blindness”—that is, a 
strategic refusal to see a body as animated by mind—in the work of satirists from 
Jonathan Swift to Auberon Waugh. The “situational mind blindness” practiced 
by such writers is a “tool of emotional dominance”; it denies “other people the 
perspective of rational agency by turning them into animals, machines, or any-
thing without a mind” (87). Similarly, I’ve demonstrated elsewhere that writers of 
fiction make some characters seem capable of more complex mental states than 
others and intuitively employ these hierarchies of “sociocognitive complexity” 
for a variety of ideological agendas (Zunshine, “1700–1775”).
  To the extent that cognitive biases are inseparable from mindreading, 
the effect of these biases on the popular and scientific perception of autism is 
both deeply ironic and tragic. Because the functioning of their theory of mind 
prompts neurotypicals to correlate observable body language with underlying 
mental states (e.g., “she is looking at me so she must be paying attention to what 
I am saying”), when faced with body language that does not yield itself to an 
interpretation in terms of familiar/conventional mental states, a neurotypical 
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observer is quick to assume that the mental state behind the behavior is either 
absent or intentionally asocial. And given the difficulties that many autistics have 
with proprioception (i.e., awareness of their body) and the ability to control their 
body language, particularly in an environment containing sensory and/or social 
stressors, their observable behavior simply does not fit the neurotypical idea of a 
suitable “performance” of recognizable mental states. The profound irony of this 
situation is that it is the neurotypical observer who is “mindblind” (i.e., incapable 
of reading the other person’s mind) yet the label of mindblindness or “impaired” 
theory of mind is firmly attached to the individual exhibiting the unconventional 
behavior.
  Consider this description by Lucy Blackman (a non-speaking autistic writer) 
of how her body would spiral into a ritualistic response during a social interac-
tion in public. (Note, too, that some might interpret Blackman’s use of the word 
“ridiculous” as indicative of her having internalized the dominant neurotypical 
assumption that what is typical is superior.)
The strange thing was that I could see the ridiculous and comic scenario 
in my mind’s eye, but I could not alter the behavior. As the other person 
got more and more embarrassed, I became more and more “autistic.” 
Once when I was eighteen I was walking home from school. An elderly 
lady stood next to me at the pedestrian crossing. I assume she was con-
cerned at my odd movements. She asked me if I were all right. Confused 
by the fact that she expected me to respond, I started running in a little 
circle. When Jay came to find me nearly half an hour later, I was still 
describing ritualistic circles, and my would-be benefactor was stand-
ing aghast, with an attitude of an affable bird mesmerized by a newly 
hatched snake. (Lucy’s Story 41)
 As Douglas Biklen puts it in his collaborative study autism and the Myth of the 
Person alone, “physical actions” of people with autism “do not necessarily reveal 
[their] thinking abilities.” For instance, if one merely observes Blackman “from 
a normate/outsider perspective, her actions can mislead.” Her “complex social 
thinking . . . might seem unimaginable if we had seen only that she paced in the 
school hallway, seemingly unable to speak, and walked away from social interac-
tions.” But this failure in empathetic imagination is the neurotypical observer’s 
and not the autist’s: when Blackman walks away from a conversation, this “may 
reflect [her] excitement or a desire to manage excitement, not indifference to the 
conversation” (53–54).
  What feels, from the inside, like a body that refuses to cooperate with its 
brain is interpreted, from the outside, as evidence that the “mind is incapable 
of thinking” (Biklen 136). As Mukhopadhyay explains, “I had been labeled as 
mentally retarded when I had my first encounter with the psychologist. I was 
three years old then. The proof for my retardation was that I could not follow 
basic commands. I was not able to apply my knowledge although I could under-
stand perfectly well what was being asked (“Questions” 136). Commenting on 
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this mind-body disconnect as a persistent feature of her son’s autism, Mukho-
padhyay’s mother, Soma, says that “it is her dream that [Tito] will be able to talk 
about picking up a cup, for example, and then do it” (Biklen 273). Jamie Burke 
reports that when he “was growing up, speaking was so frustrating. I could see 
the words in my brain but when I realized that making my mouth move would 
get those letters to come alive, they died as soon as they were born. What made 
me feel angry was to know that I knew exactly what I was to say and my brain was 
retreating in defeat” (250–51). Your son, DJ Savarese, explains that the reason his 
responses are delayed is that “stress and excitement cause [his] sympathetic auto-
nomic system to engage.” Hence his suggestions to people who talk with him:
First, ignore my involuntary gestures, including my signs for “done” and 
“break.” They fearfully hear years of negative fear and try to keep me 
locked into a cycle of autonomic impulses. Remember these gestures are 
not voluntary. They are just my body’s way of responding to stimuli. If 
you respond to them as meaningful, they fearfully rev my heart more, 
but if you wait patiently and wordlessly, you free me to finally respond 
voluntarily. Once I’ve freed my body to respond, I can skip over the au-
tonomic responses and give faster motor replies as the conversation con-
tinues. (“Communicate With Me”)
 Learning to type, write, or point to letters or words, on their own or with the 
gradually-decreasing help of facilitators,6 can make a tremendous difference in 
the non-verbal autistic person’s ability to reveal his or her complex social think-
ing, yet so far this “inside-out” perspective of autism seems to have made little 
difference in the mainstream “outside-in” view of autism as mindblindness (Wil-
liams, autism—an inside-Out 7–17).
  Reflecting on the laboratory settings in which this outside-in view is con-
structed, Blackman observes,
It may be that the social deficits which are the cornerstone of an au-
tism spectrum diagnosis tell us far more about the person who made 
them markers for such a diagnosis than about the child whom she ob-
serves. . . . That is, the whole testing procedure is somehow actually con-
structed on whether the tester observed the person to socialize in a way 
that the tester understood to be socialization. . . . We often use the term 
“communication” when really we mean that we have observed in an-
other human being a behavior from which we derive meaning. (“Reflec-
tions” 149, 153)
 If only it were possible to be constantly aware of the “metaphorical nature” (Biklen 
38) of the concept of mindblindness when applied to autism, this concept might 
be less insidious. Imagine that, upon encountering a person who strikes you as 
“mindblind”—a person apparently unaware of your intentions to communicate 
with her and thus walking off in the middle of the conversation (as Blackman 
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does above)—you were to assume that it is you who is mindblind right now, that 
it is you who doesn’t know how to read the person’s behavior. You would either 
make an extra effort to understand what’s going on or, failing that, conclude that 
your mindreading abilities are not sufficient for this situation. Note that when the 
charge of mindblindess is thus reversed and applied to you, it’s very easy to see 
it as a metaphor: an indication of a specific communication failure that can be 
resolved. All pragmatics, no essentialism.
  At present, however, the refusal to acknowledge autistic mindblindness as a 
metaphor feeds essentialist thinking. We have seen before the potency of mind-
blindness as a “trope of dehumanization” (Vermeule 87). Ascribing an impov-
erished mental state to a person is a step necessary for imagining him or her as 
the Other. In aiDS and its Metaphors, Susan Sontag notes that the “enduring Eu-
rocentric presumptions about others [depend on] the fantasy that peoples with 
little reason to expect exemption from misfortune have a lessened capacity to feel 
misfortune. Thus it is believed that Asians (or the poor, or blacks, or Africans, 
or Muslims) don’t suffer or don’t grieve as Europeans (or whites) do” (51). As-
serting that autistics lack theory of mind assumes that they would not be able to 
feel the meaning of this assertion and suffer. That they themselves beg to differ, 
finding this description of their condition “vague, misleading, and inaccurate,” is 
ignored.7
  It’s only fitting, too, that as mindblindness, autism terrifies. Perceiving a per-
son as lacking an essential quality that makes him or her fully human nurtures 
what Ari Ne’eman, a co-founder of ASAN, calls “the rhetoric of pity and despair” 
(“The Future”). Moreover, if autistics themselves are imagined as lacking the 
thoughts and feelings that we were ready to project onto them, those thoughts 
and feelings don’t just disappear. Instead (inveterate mind-readers that we are), 
we transfer them onto autism itself, personified as the enemy, bursting with in-
tentions and emotions. For instance, autism delights in the misery it causes—not 
to people on the spectrum (for they, of course, “can’t feel”)—but to those around 
them. Emily Thornton Savarese and you present this portrait of autism personi-
fied in your critique of the video released in 2009 by Autism Speaks, which was 
“designed to raise money for scientific research and . . . employed the organiza-
tion’s characteristic scare tactics in the push for a cure”:
“I am autism,” the sound-track declares. “I am visible in your children, 
but if I can help it, I am invisible to you until it’s too late. . . . I work faster 
than pediatric aids, cancer, and diabetes combined.” Upping the terror 
ante, it remarks snidely, “If you’re happily married, I will make sure your 
marriage fails. Your money will fall into my hands, and I will bankrupt 
you for my own self-gain.” The video then references the plight of under-
funded scientists, the heroes in this implied drama between good and 
evil. “Your scientists don’t have the resources,” it says, “and I relish their 
desperation.” Sounding like Satan himself, autism concludes, “I derive 
great pleasure out of your loneliness. I will fight to take away your hope. 
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I will plot to rob you of your children and your dreams.” (“The Superior 
Half ”)
 As someone well familiar with the practice of treating mindblindness as an actual 
descriptor of autism instead of a metaphor, would you comment on the staying 
power of this concept? Do the diagnostic benefits of retaining this concept out-
weigh or at least balance out the very real danger of dehumanizing people de-
scribed as mindblind? Who will lose out if this concept is abandoned altogether?
RJS: Our profession, like the medical or science profession, isn’t particularly good 
at admitting, “I was wrong” or “There’s a better way of proceeding.” And so, like 
a weed with deep roots, the notion of autistic mindblindness will be difficult to 
eradicate. Too many neurotypicals—from scientists to doctors to psychologists 
to teachers to service professionals to consumers of our popular culture—seem 
wedded to this stereoconcept. And we know from Thomas Kuhn that defenders 
of a prevailing paradigm rarely abandon what has served them well profession-
ally until the paradigm has all but crumbled.
  At the same time, we must recognize that autism is heterogeneous and that 
some autistics, including any number with Asperger syndrome—the people you 
cite would be labeled “classical” or “low-functioning” autistics and may be very 
different from other groups on the spectrum—buy into mindblindness. Think 
of Temple Grandin, for example. But even here we need to be cautious. For one 
thing, we have extrapolated too much from Grandin: not all, maybe not even a 
majority of, so-called high-functioning autistics or Aspies believe that they have 
difficulty reading other minds. For another, Grandin explicitly states that she has 
gotten better at this activity, which suggests that such a deficit is anything but 
strictly innate or hardwired. Finally, discussions of Grandin’s mindreading abili-
ties almost never acknowledge how well she reads the minds of animals—indeed 
how much better she is at this skill than most neurotypicals. Such a glaring omis-
sion reveals the bias that is built into a purportedly neutral test of mindreading: 
what a theory of mind test actually gauges is the ability to read a highly particular 
kind of mind, a mind that has put itself at the center of the universe—above all 
other organisms and entities.
  Of course, we don’t speak of neurotypical deficits with respect to theory of 
mind and animals because we don’t tend to prize this sort of skill and, even more 
important, because we don’t tend to think of ourselves as having deficits: we, af-
ter all, are the norm. But as you point out, theory of mind ought to work in two 
directions: if we’re going to judge autistics on their ability to read neurotypical 
minds, then we must be judged on our ability to read autistic ones. The obvious 
politics of mindreading—how well do white Americans read black Americans, 
or rich Americans poor Americans, or Americans generally and the rest of the 
world?—should give pause to anyone wanting to hold forth on autistic deficits.
  In addition to the above problems, a classic test of theory of mind, the “Sally-
Anne” task, which uses false beliefs to measure a person’s awareness of other 
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minds, turns out to be formally inhospitable. When the test’s verbal instructions 
and answers were replaced with drawings, autistic children actually did better 
than nonautistic ones, which again shows the danger of confusing difference—in 
this case a preference for visual over verbal processing—with deficit.8 As in the 
“Level and Nature of Autistic Intelligence” study, adapting or changing the test-
ing vehicle proved decisive.
  Must the explanatory power of theory of mind be derived from pathologizing 
autistics? I think you would say, “No.” What I’d like to see is a humble, neurocos-
mopolitan theory of mind that doesn’t test for the performance of a central emo-
tion in a normative or naturalized way.
LZ: In your recent work, you emphasize that it is not enough to acknowledge the 
neurotypical problem of presuming that classical autistics must not have theory 
of mind because they don’t comport themselves in ways that neurotypicals rec-
ognize as socially meaningful and acceptable. You argue that it’s also important 
to address autism as a set of actual neurological differences. I understand that 
this is a controversial issue in your own field of disability studies. What are the 
assumptions that make it controversial and what are the payoffs of introducing 
this complicating factor into the discussion?
RJS: As it was developing, the field of disability studies did not know what to do with 
cognitive disability—largely because it did not seem to fit the model of social 
construction to which it was so committed. That model had proven tremendous-
ly effective in exposing the negative cultural meanings that had become attached 
to disability, but it seemed a good deal more credible when the disability involved 
a leg or an eye or an immune system than when it involved the very organ of 
thought. With respect to autism, the question becomes: how to attend to the his-
tory of damaging assumptions about the disorder while also acknowledging the 
actual neurological differences that underpin it? Such differences are themselves 
culturally shaped and interpreted, to be sure, but they cannot be neatly managed 
by a pure social-constructionist perspective.
  I’ve already referenced prosopagnosia and synesthesia; let me mention an-
other difference in autism: the processing of speech sounds. A study from 2008 
found that autistics exhibit “superior perceptual processing of speech relative to 
controls” (Jarvinen-Pasley et al. 103), meaning that they actually hear speech 
sounds more precisely and robustly than nonautistics, but inferior semantic 
processing, meaning that they do not interpret those sounds as well symboli-
cally. Interestingly, for nonautistics “increased attention to content information 
result[ed] in poorer perceptual than comprehension performance” (117). In oth-
er words, the instrumental use of language depends on ignoring, at least to a de-
gree, the sensuous materiality of the signifiers. Nonautistics don’t fully listen to 
what they hear: they convert the auditory stream into something useful, which is 
to say symbolic. In fact, the very basis of semantic decoding, phonemic general-
ization, requires active distortion: perceived sound does not match the shape of 
the actual sound wave.
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  Are there settings in which a perceptual relation to speech sounds might 
constitute a strength? How about literary language—poetry in particular? While 
poetry cannot function without some meaning, the non-semantic patterning of 
perceptual details is central to the art; indeed, such patterning in the form of al-
literation, consonance, assonance, and rhythm musically subordinates ordinary 
linguistic function.
  Consider the following passage by Mukhopadhyay. In it he is trying to prove 
his competence to a researcher who doubts that the “severely” autistic can master 
language. He has been asked to listen to something being read aloud by an aide, 
but he finds himself focusing on the sound of what the man says, not the mean-
ing of his words:
 Claude read. . . . I saw the voice transform into long apple green and 
yellow strings, searching under the table for who knows what? Threads 
like raw silk forming from Claude’s voice.
 Claude read. I watched those strings vibrate with different ampli-
tudes as Claude tried to impress the silent beholders and serious re-
searchers of autism with the varying tones of a near-to-perfection 
performance.
 Claude read. I watched those strings with stresses and strains, reach-
ing their own elastic limits and snapping every now and then, when his 
voice reached a certain pitch. I saw those snapped strings form knots 
like entangled silk, the color of apple green and yellow. (How Can i talk, 
200–201)
 When the neurologist asks, “So, what was he reading?” Mukhopadhyay responds 
with a sentence about “the beauty of the color green, when yellow sunshine melts 
its way through newly grown leaves” (201). The expert interprets his answer ex-
clusively as a failure to understand what was read to him—not as a lucid and 
indeed artful description of the voice’s alternative (and alternatively narrative) 
registration. Mukhopadhyay has had to teach himself not to process spoken lan-
guage in this manner, but when anxiety runs high, typical comprehension proves 
exceedingly difficult.
  What Mukhopadhyay offers the reader is a linguistically meaningful, yet 
highly patterned, account of perceptual awareness. (Notice the anaphora—
“Claude read,” “Claude read,” Claude read”—and the varied yet resolved inter-
nal repetition—“I saw,” “I watched,” “I watched,” “I saw.”) Moreover, he uses vi-
sual images to convey the auditory stream emanating from Claude’s mouth. As 
if confirming what V. S. Ramachandran and David Brang have proposed—that 
a sensory phenomenon (synesthesia) may have given rise in our species to a lin-
guistic one (figurative language)—metaphor emerges from his body: his ears see 
acoustical vibrations as silky strings. That the processing of both metaphor and 
concrete language involves sensory cortices, in addition to the brain’s traditional 
language centers, only underscores the way that poetry, as a heightened form 
of literary language, brings semantics and perception into closer relation.9 Like 
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autistics, poets “live in the sensory” (autism and Sensing 17), in Donna Wil-
liams’s phrase.
  While Mukhopadhyay’s account reveals a significant problem in autism, it 
also reveals one in neurotypicality: the reduction of language to mere meaning. 
Of course, this problem goes unrecognized, though I see it frequently at Grin-
nell in my creative writing classes: bright neurotypical students are generally too 
plugged into semantics. Their language is abstract; their ears, unmusical. They 
do not attend to the business of fashioning acoustical textures and fabrics. In 
Mukhopadhyay’s retorospective response to the good doctor’s test of oral com-
prehension, a perceptual intelligence has found a home in semantics—this is the 
essence of neurocosmopolitanism. Might a semantic intelligence find a home in 
perception? Might we coax each neurotype out of its respective comfort area—
toward what Reuven Tsur calls a blended “third poetic mode” of speech process-
ing? Might we recognize, in short, complementary cognitive strengths and weak-
nesses, so long as we understand those strengths and weaknesses as anything but 
fixed and strictly “natural”?
Writers and Readers on the Spectrum
LZ: Once one has read books by autistic writers, such as Mukhopadhyay, Prince, and 
Donna Williams, it becomes impossible to think of autism as a condition char-
acterized by “mindblindness” and “a lack of imagination.” Yet the conventional 
thinking about autism dismisses such writers as anomalies—the outliers of the 
autistic spectrum. A “typical” autist, after all, doesn’t write the way Mukhopad-
hyay, Williams, and Prince do. The last I checked, however, a typical neurotypical 
doesn’t write the way Henry James, Shakespeare, and Austen do either. Yet as we 
admire James’s, Shakespeare’s, and Austen’s genius, we do not say that they are 
anomalies and outliers on the neurotypical spectrum. Instead we feel that they 
are “like us,” only more intensely so, glorifying the community of “us,” by show-
ing “us” what “we” are capable of. Can you comment on the conceptual sleight-
of-hand that goes into sustaining this biased view of the autistic vs. neurotypical 
achievement? What institutional and ideological practices depend on and nur-
ture this view?
RJS: A couple of years ago I wrote to the authors of a study on metaphoric compre-
hension in Asperger syndrome, which claimed to have confirmed a significant 
deficit, and asked if they had controlled for exposure to metaphor instruction. 
Students with AS tend to be tracked into math and science courses and thus do 
not have a chance to get comfortable with novel metaphors. But even before such 
specific instruction, more generalized language instruction might be needed. Af-
ter all, what has been described as a nonverbal intelligence has to find its way in 
an alien medium. I asked further if the authors had controlled for test anxiety—
anxiety, as I have intimated, is a huge component of autism generally—and al-
The Critic as Neurocosmopolite  29
lowed participants to take the test multiple times. Ignoring these questions, one 
of the authors zeroed in on my reference to prominent Aspies who seem to have 
a gift for metaphor, commenting that the study proved a probabilistic deficit—
meaning that, on average, Aspies were less able to understand novel metaphors 
than neurotypicals.
  So, at the very least, scientists need to be consistent: either Shakespeare is an 
outlier, as you suggest, and neurotypicals have a monumental probabilistic defi-
cit, or he is not! But there’s something else going on here, too, and it has a lot to do 
with your previous concerns about essentialism. Why is it inappropriate to claim 
that African Americans or women are inferior to Caucasians and men at science 
but perfectly acceptable to claim that people with AS or autism generally are in-
ferior to neurotypicals at reading literature? What prevents a responsible person 
from saying the former is precisely a recognition of the many social factors that 
condition competence. Why should these factors not be at play when we’re talk-
ing about neurodiverse brains? Any generalizations about this minority popula-
tion must wait until we see how purportedly immune it is to instruction.10 In the 
case of so-called “classical” or “low-functioning” autistics, the labor involved in 
remediating embodiment challenges, curbing anxiety, and teaching literacy and 
communication is so prodigious—I know this personally—as to threaten render-
ing the relatively few who do get what they need, outliers forever.
LZ: In your essay “River of Words, Raft of Our Conjoined Neurologies,” you talk 
about the experience of reading Huckleberry Finn with your son. Would you 
also speak of the experience of reading Moby-Dick with Tito Mukhopadhyay? It 
seems to me that this would be relevant to researchers in a variety of fields, in-
cluding, but not limited to, developmental psychologists studying reading prefer-
ences in autism, as well as narrative theorists.
RJS: Unlike my son, DJ, who is Oberlin College’s first nonspeaking autistic student, 
Mukhopadhyay has never been allowed in a regular school—despite authoring 
four books, as I noted, and serving as the subject of a 60 Minutes profile. That he 
has been denied a formal education has been a source of great sadness for him. 
In fact, Mukhopadhyay once responded to an interviewer’s question about the 
essential attributes of a welcoming school by erupting into rhythmic and rhymed 
despair:
My school is that open dream
my words find hard to say.
My school is the doubt in your eyes
and my withdrawing away.
My school is the summer dust grain
I saw coming through my window,
trying to find a way to my room
then disappearing in an obscure shadow. (Biklen 135)
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 And so I have been Skyping Mukhopadhyay into my classes at Grinnell Col-
lege and conducting private tutorials with him. This past year, while I was on 
fellowship at Duke University’s Institute for Brain Sciences, we read Moby-Dick 
together by Skype, two chapters a week—I spoke, and Mukhopadhyay used the 
sidebar to type his comments. In addition to preparing notes on the chapters, 
Mukhopadhyay also wrote verse, using a line from one of the two chapters as an 
epigraph.
  For example, in the following poem, Mukhopadhyay takes up a matter al-
ready discussed, ingenuously recasting Ishmael’s failure to look for whales on the 
mast-head of the Pequod as a metaphor for his own failure to listen for meaning 
on the mast-head of human speech. If you recall, at one point in Moby-Dick, Ish-
mael reflects on his “lean brown and hollow eye; given to unseasonable medita-
tiveness” (153), which hardly suit him for a job in “your vigilant fisheries” (153). 
“Let me . . . frankly admit that I kept but sorry guard,” he exclaims. “With the 
problem of the universe revolving around in me, how could I . . . but lightly hold 
my obligations to observe all whale-ships’ standing orders, ‘Keep your weather 
eye open, and sing out every time’” (153).
I Kept But Sorry Guard
There might have been shoals of them in the far horizon.
—Herman Melville, Moby-Dick
His voice was a mere frequency of sound.
Like any other voice, it carried a wave in sound.
I saw the wave come bouncing around.
There might have been words moving along that wave,
Moving past me, sailing down that wave,
Lingering a little before they escaped.
The voice before me—its frequency was blue.
Light as the light, the spreading of that blue.
Lulled into listlessness, I was lulled into blue.
He asked me questions—maybe one or two—
as I manned the mast-head but failed to pursue
those shoals of meaning in a far away blue.
 In Mukhopadhyay’s redeployment, the phrase “keep[ing] sorry guard” memo-
rably expresses the cost of each orientation to language—each form of whale 
hunt.
  It also invites us to think of narrative less semantically. In a recent article, 
Melba Cuddy-Keane explores how literary narrative makes visible—or stages—
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a kind of “visceral thinking . . . [that] depends on a disconnection from abstract 
conceptual thought” (693). Alluding to the work of William James, she argues 
that “concepts, . . . in substituting truth for reality, selectively map and reductive-
ly circumscribe the fullness of our experience” (687), and she hypothesizes that 
percepts, or “phenomenal-consciousness,” in Ned Block’s term, play a crucial, if 
invisible, role in generating conceptual change. “Literary narrative’s fascination 
with phenomenal experience, with the connotative dimensions of language, and 
with the dynamics of psychological processes,” writes Cuddy-Keane, “make it a 
fertile site for tracking the fuzzy and imprecisely understood area of non-con-
scious thought and, perhaps most distinctively, the dynamic and transformative 
function that phenomenal-consciousness might serve” (688).
  Cuddy-Keane pays particular attention to novels that hinge on what Ian Watt 
has called “delayed decoding,” “as when [in Heart of Darkness] it gradually dawns 
on Marlow that what appear to be flying sticks are murderous spears” (690). Ac-
cording to Bruce Johnson, such moments strive “to return to the most aborigi-
nal sensation before concepts and rational categories are brought to bear” (qtd. 
in Cuddy-Keane 690). For Cuddy-Keane these moments are not “moments of 
‘truth’ but moments when any truth claims are of necessity suspended, and the 
delay activates a positive hiatus of consciousness, a withholding of logical expla-
nation, to clear a space for unmediated, non-conscious sensory response” (690). 
Or as she puts it at the end of her article, “The impression, rather than crystalliz-
ing the object, breaks up the habit of crystallization, immersing us in the profu-
sion, and confusion, of the sensory whole” (695).
  Autistics, as Mukhopadhyay and others make clear, accomplish this state all 
too easily and, at least in retrospect, all too consciously. Indeed, they often strug-
gle to generate the conceptual certainty against which literary narrative is said to 
rail. With its story of horrific disaster, a novel like Moby-Dick very much concerns 
itself with phenomenal-consciousness. Down-regulating the left-hemisphere’s 
traditional language centers and areas of executive control, particularly the dor-
sal lateral pre-frontal cortex, while up-regulating the right hemisphere’s limbic 
regions, trauma violently frees perceptual input from conceptual subordination 
or mastery.11 Put simply, it lodges at the pre-categorical level. It leaves the victim 
flailing in an affective bath, unable to organize the past or to live with his own 
body—his own senses—in the present.
  Mukhopadhyay and I talked extensively about what the survivor Ishmael is 
up to with his narrativizing, especially since we had each read the novel before, 
though never this slowly and with this much focused attention. Why is the story 
so jumbled? Why does it constantly shift modes? Why is the language so palpably 
embodied and metaphorical? I familiarized Mukhopadhyay with recent works 
on trauma, including a masters thesis by a Spanish graduate student, which care-
fully applies insights from trauma theory to show that the novel’s form is the 
clearest expression of Ishmael’s unresolved psychic injury. With that form, Pilar 
Martinez argues, he is simultaneously “acting out and working through.” In one 
of our Skype chats, Mukhopadhyay remarked, “It is nice to go back to some chap-
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ters and read again because it is as if we are watching Ishmael digesting the story 
as a therapy.”
  At first, he found the “Ceteology” chapter “exhausting.” “It reminds me of 
autism,” he wrote, “when someone is obsessed with something and expects oth-
ers to find the same interest in it.” “I think of my own obsessions,” he added, 
“and want everyone to be as passionate as I am.” Later, he remarked, “Little did 
I realize how much I had missed when I read [the novel] for the first time. Back 
then, I did not recognize that the information on whales and whaling provided 
by Ishmael was no fog.” “The second reading of the book was different,” he typed 
emphatically. “I wasn’t hunting any story. One must know what one should be 
looking for in a book.”
  After setting up the idea that Ishmael might still be traumatized, we then dis-
cussed a fundamental paradox of traumatic recovery: the restoration of narrative 
control—or in neurobiological terms, the return to subjugating perceptual input 
through top-down processing. Together, we decided that by cultivating a formal 
uneasiness in Moby-Dick, Melville gives voice to an insoluble problem: to move 
forward in time, Ishmael must forget the past; conversely, to truly remember his 
comrades, in particular Queequeg, he must court psychological impairment. As 
a Vietnam veteran once remarked, “I do not want to take drugs for my night-
mares because I must remain a memorial to my dead friends” (Caruth vii).
  In technical terms, a flashback consists of “sensory-perceptual, visuospatial 
mental images” (Holmes et al.); importantly, it uses a delivery system similar to 
literature’s. As Alan Richardson contends, leaning on the work of Elaine Scarry, 
“The ‘great sensory writers’ endow their visual images with the vivacity of live 
perception. . . . Readers mentally produce images ‘under the instruction’ of the 
writer.” And yet, literature, unlike a flashback, obviously requires vigorous activ-
ity in the left frontal lobe, even as it atypically recruits posterior regions for lin-
guistic activity. In sum, literature gives to phenomenal-consciousness a guiding, 
if sometimes purposefully shaky, conceptual hand.
  When, at the beginning of chapter four, Ishmael reports, “Upon waking next 
morning about daylight, I found Queequeeg’s arm thrown over me in the most 
loving and affectionate manner” (41), we should not forget that Queequeg has al-
ready perished. Indeed, Ishmael retrospectively offers us an image, one that now 
haunts the present tense of his writing. Nor should we forget Ishmael’s original 
conceptual confusion, as he mistook his bedmate’s tattooed arm for the patch-
work quilt on top of them. “It was only by the sense of weight and pressure that I 
could tell that Queequeg was hugging me” (41), Ishmael explains. Having tempo-
rarily lost the colonizing prowess of sight, he could feel in his body the unmedi-
ated presence of Queequeg’s arm, the absence of which he now grieves. Learning 
to love the Pacific Islander, we might say, was precisely a matter of moving un-
derneath the stable concept of “savage.” Delayed decoding, to once again borrow 
Cuddy-Keane’s wording, “br[oke] up the habit of crystallization, immersing [Ish-
mael] in the profusion, and confusion, of the sensory whole” (695). This, Mukho-
padhyay reminded me, is how classical autistics consistently take in the world.
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  When we turned finally to the issue of Melville’s relentless analogizing, we 
both saw our “matrimonial” (43) couple as a kind of metaphor for metaphor, that 
yoking together of disparate things. Grief, along with a considerable amount of 
survivor guilt, seems to motivate Ishmael’s frantic, “bridegroom clasp” (42) in 
words. As he figuratively reaches for Queequeg everywhere, he literally unmakes 
the world. He undermines the basis upon which any concept can be said to be 
discrete, at once overwhelmed by the violence of what happened to him and pro-
foundly attracted to the phenomenal realm as a site of faithful, because affectively 
palpable, memory. At the same time, he makes meaning; he jerry-rigs a narrative. 
Queequeg becomes Queequeg, not just that “sense of weight and pressure” on his 
chest. To allow his former bedfellow to dissolve into pure sensory remembrance 
would be to embrace the nullifying whiteness of the whale. And yet, to allow him 
to become an easily managed concept would be to blithely move on.
  Analyzing just one of the many analogies in the chapter entitled “Squid”—
the Pequod’s “three tall tapering masts mildly waved to the languid breeze, as 
three mild palms on a plain” (249)—Mukhopadhyay commented, “For Ishmael 
the synthesis of land and sea, masts and palms, reflects his understanding of the 
duality of every aspect of this world—mind and body, sensation and pain.” This 
duality shows up in literature as a negotiated interaction of concepts and per-
cepts, and it thus renders literature an ideal site for performing the stalemate of 
partially worked through trauma. As Mukhopadhyay helped me to see, it also 
renders literature an ideal site for exploring different relationships to language 
and for advancing a notion of fluid neurocosmopolitanism.
Autism and the Future of Literary Studies
LZ: In the last couple of years it has become a convention among literary scholars, 
especially those working with cognitive approaches to literature, to mention au-
tism briefly in their essays and calls for papers as a locus of “lack” (most often 
associated with “mindblindness”) and as such, a ready point of contrast to this or 
that neurotypical feature. Having, to my regret, contributed to that convention 
myself, I know that it came about by following an apparent consensus in cogni-
tive science. The problem with this consensus, however, is that whereas cognitive 
scientists often point out that no two individuals on the spectrum are alike in 
their cognitive profiles and social abilities, at present there seems to be no room 
in their publications for acknowledging and integrating the insights of autistic 
writers and disability activists. Scholars who make these insights a cornerstone 
of their research program, such as Douglas Biklen, are considered highly contro-
versial. It is altogether possible to keep up with the up-to-date research on autism 
in various branches of cognitive science without so much as suspecting that this 
perspective exists.
  How then do we talk about autism now that we realize we cannot simply 
rely on mainstream scientific discourse and echo its impersonal “outside-in” view 
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of the condition? As more literary scholars discover the profoundly philosophic 
and poetical body of writing by autistic authors, I believe we will see an upsurge 
in literary analysis of this writing. Your book, reasonable People, which is based 
on your experience as the adoptive father of a nonspeaking autist, documents a 
struggle to engage the “meaning of family and the politics of neurological differ-
ence.” Would you comment on ways of writing about autism without romanti-
cizing it on the one hand, and without constructing, on the other, what James T. 
Fisher has called the autism “conversion narrative” (51), that is, a “record of the 
quest for a transformed or redeemed self,” in which the “enigma that is fictional 
autistic presence still operates, as in the classic prosthetic disability narrative, to 
inform the non-autistic majority and leave it supposedly wiser” (Murray, “Autism 
Functions”)?
RJS: I would need many pages to adequately discuss what makes Biklen controver-
sial.12 Some researchers believe, as I pointed out earlier, that partnering with 
autistics is the only way to do first-rate science on autism, so it’s not simply a 
matter of choosing, once one is aware of a choice, between progressive qualita-
tive and stigmatizing quantitative research by neurotypicals. Eventually there 
will be a rich body of neurocosmopolitan research that will prevent exactly the 
problem you mention. One of ASAN’s projects, the Academic Autistic Spec-
trum Partnership in Research and Education (AASPIRE), upholds the idea of 
community-based participatory research, “whereby researchers and communi-
ty members serve as equal partners throughout the research process.”13 In the 
humanities and social sciences, I think it’s possible to practice this approach as 
well. Of the forty-some contributors to “Autism and the Concept of Neurodiver-
sity,” a special issue of Disability Studies Quarterly that my wife and I co-edited, 
half are on the spectrum. reasonable People concludes with a chapter written by 
my then twelve-year-old son, a chapter in which he tells me all sorts of things 
that I got wrong! Instead of writing exclusively “about” autistics, let’s imagine 
writing “with” them—even if that “with” is simply a matter of engaging their 
words and even if, as imperfect neurocosmopolitan allies, we sometimes make 
mistakes. In the meantime, cognitive literary scholars really ought to drop their 
passing references to autistic dysfunction and begin to acquaint themselves with 
both the minority view of autism and the central tenets of disability studies. This 
will only help their research. The human brain is so much more interesting than 
what the normal/abnormal binary allows.
  I certainly hope that “as more literary scholars discover the profoundly philo-
sophic and poetical body of writing by autistic authors, . . . we will see an upsurge 
in literary analysis of this writing.” There is already some terrific work by Bruce 
Mills, Kristina Chew, Stuart Murray, Julia Rodas, and Chris Foss, to mention 
just a few scholars—I especially like the work of Melanie Yergeau. As you point 
out, Fisher demarcates the dangers of writing about autism: romanticizing autis-
tic difference, especially super abilities, without acknowledging the considerable 
challenges that it brings or promoting a kind of one-sided apprenticeship, which 
is to say the reduction of autistic difference to a less than adequate, but nonethe-
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less commendably learned, performance of the non-autistic norm. In either case, 
autism exists largely for neurotypicals as a self-aggrandizing mirror, for even the 
narrow superiority of the savant turns out to be a tragic expression of core hu-
man abilities. With so much pathological thinking about autism, I would rather 
be guilty of the former sin; at least it begins to respectfully acknowledge differ-
ence. In fact, the charge of romanticization seems to be leveled at anyone who 
briefly suspends the all-negative, all-the-time approach to this condition.
  How to see the neurological other without always seeing ourselves? This is 
the key question. If we can practice Gilroy’s ethic of defamiliarization, something 
like actual savantism might appear to be just a form of life and not the basis for a 
rain Man movie.
LZ: It is profoundly ironic that by focusing on “lacks” conventionally associated with 
autism, literary critics have remained unaware of the significance of the insights 
into perception offered by writers on the spectrum. For instance, you’ve men-
tioned defamiliarization several times. By submerging her readers into a rich 
“sensory-perceptual experience” of the autistic person, Donna Williams develops 
nothing less than a neurological foundation for the feature of poetic language 
that literary critics have tried to grasp and explain using that term.14 When Liane 
Holliday Willey, a writer and researcher with Asperger Syndrome, describes how 
her “aspie” daughter’s “ability to pick up the most minute details makes her espe-
cially strong at figuring out the answer to who dun-it in mystery novels” (151), 
one realizes that detective stories must exploit a particular cognitive vulnerability 
of neurotypical readers, i.e., their tendency to skip over details in their quest for 
a larger picture. One begins to wonder how different genres adapt themselves 
to various traits in the cognitive profiles of their reader populations. Moreover, 
Willey’s vivid description of “sensory assemblies” that “take the thoughts to spots 
only aspies can really relate to” (152) offers a glimpse into the secret of human 
creativity and begins to explain why “success in science and art,” as research-
ers have long observed, is not possible without a “dash of autism” (Snyder 83). 
Would you comment on your work teaching nonspeaking autistics to write po-
etry? What it might it tell us about the genre?
RJS: Let me return to the issue of pattern, which I mentioned earlier. In her won-
derful new book, always More Than One: individuation’s Dance, Erin Manning, 
philosopher and co-founder of the Sense Lab at Concordia University, argues, 
“What autistics have access to that is usually backgrounded for neurotypicals 
is the direct experience of the relational field’s morphing into subjects and ob-
jects” (219).15 In this respect—and only in this respect, I must emphasize—they 
are like very young children. “Sensory knowing starts with the recognition of 
patterns [that] are less accessible to conscious . . . rational thought” (68), writes 
Olga Bogdashina. “Memories of very early experiences (before the appearance 
of verbal language) become stored and expressed as sensations rather than in 
highly elaborate form” (68). “With maturation,” Bogdashina continues, “there is 
a strategy to suppress [‘raw sensory data’]. The maturing mind becomes increas-
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ingly aware only of concepts to the exclusion of the details that comprise these 
concepts” (84).16
  As I’ve tried to demonstrate with Cuddy-Keane’s work on phenomenal con-
sciousness, novels can provide neurotypicals with a glimpse of what classical au-
tistics regularly experience. But if any genre seems especially suited to captur-
ing “the world in its emergence” or the “ecology of what is unfolding around 
[us]” (Manning 152), it is poetry, specifically formal poetry. In this kind of verbal 
vessel, pattern is everything. Indeed, the symbolic function of language almost 
seems hitched to the palpable design, as it does in this recent poem by Mukho-
padhyay entitled “Orange”:
It was orange as always, when I heard the wind.
Orange it is—the sound of the wind in spring.
It made the branches swing. It colored every little thing.
It smelled in orange—that sound of wind in spring.
Orange it is—as always—the sudden wind.
It kept getting wilder—its orange on everything. (i am Not a Poet 10)
 Such a form seems to present itself as a linguistic translation of a nonlinguistic 
propensity: “a type of attunement,” according to Bogdashina, “in which incom-
ing information is translated from one sensory modality into another while pre-
serving the underlying pattern” (68). To the pre-verbal child, perceptions “are 
not sights and sounds and touches and nameable objects, but rather shapes, in-
tensities and temporal patterns” (51), Daniel Stern reminds us. If an infant could 
write poetry, it would sound a lot like this poem: higher-order thinking as pure 
synesthetic relation.
  Pattern, let me suggest, is what attracts classical autistics to poetry. Although 
Mukhopadhyay obviously learned how to use language symbolically, he still 
thinks of poetry as “an ambition to please the ear” (R. Savarese, “More Than a 
Thing”). “Designs can be visual,” he has remarked, “and designs can be formed in 
sound”—the pattern makes it “more than a thing to ignore” (R. Savarese, “More 
Than a Thing”). When teaching poetry writing workshops to classical autistics, I 
invariably ask them to write a villanelle. The first time I did so, I was astonished at 
how quickly and effectively they managed the task; in the same amount of time, 
my “control group” of nonautistic education professors managed maybe six or 
seven of the required nineteen lines. One autist claimed that the form itself was 
autistic—its perseverative, morphing refrains were “like the patterns of light on 
her front lawn,” she typed.17
  A remark by Donna Williams offers further instruction. It recalls the mo-
ment in Moby-Dick when Ishmael recognizes Queequeg’s arm not by sight but 
by the “sense of weight and pressure,” and it suggests a way of thinking about 
poetry—how it depends on the meaning of words yet seeks a fuller and more 
dynamically embodied investigation of experience. Referring to herself as a sens-
ing, rather than an interpretive, creature, Williams recounts,
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I developed physically-based mapping, which involved knowing things 
not through their visual shape but through their shape experienced 
through my own physical movement. So, for example, if I felt a glass with 
my hands or gripped it in my teeth, my concept of that glass had nothing 
to do with the word ‘glass’ or with how it looked or what it was used for, 
it had to do with the pattern of movement involved in feeling its form. 
(autism and Sensing 62)
 The pattern of movement involved in feeling its form—I can’t think of a better 
definition of a poem, especially if we conceive of said movement as rhythm and 
said form as the shape of the carefully strung together—one might even say the 
mesmerizingly strung together—words. Poetry offers classical autistics a deeply 
homologous experience of “physically-based mapping,” a fact increasingly borne 
out by neuroscientific explorations of the genre.18
  I want to say a few words about the relationship of a patterning intelligence to 
narrative. We’ve already seen in the “apple green and yellow” passage how Muk-
hopadhyay redirects attention to the drama of perception. While he carefully es-
tablishes a social context in that passage—he must prove to a skeptical neurolo-
gist that he is intelligent—the focus remains squarely on his body’s response to 
speech sounds. Let me now present another passage by Mukhopadhyay in which 
he listens to a news report about a coal mining disaster. As you read the passage, 
notice the gap between what is actually going on inside of Mukhopadhyay and 
what an observer would likely conclude about his behavior: that he is oblivious 
to the suffering of others. Notice, too, how his senses—in particular, their synes-
thetic interaction—once again give birth to analogy. What follows isn’t a narra-
tive with sensory details; it’s a sensory-driven, affect-laden, visuospatial approxi-
mation of teleological thought, one perhaps reflecting, as already discussed, “an 
atypically prominent role for perceptual mechanisms in supporting cognition”:
 I see these stories, sometimes in vermillion or indigo, the richness 
depending upon the intensity of the stories. Sometimes they smell like 
vitriol and sometimes they smell like boiling starch in a pot of clay. And 
sometimes they have the essence of the twilight sky.
 As I feel my worries for the trapped coal miners, I can smell the boil-
ing starch, frothing on the brim of the clay pot, then spilling out with the 
smell of burning rice. My worries grow as the voice of the newsreader 
continues to say that the miners are still trapped. I smell burning rice 
spread across the room as more starch spills out. . . .
 My body begins to itch as though tiny black tickle ants have been set 
free from a box. They can smell the burning rice from the spilling starch, 
and they rush around to find the source with a collective ant hunger. My 
worry now accumulates in and across my itching skin, as the voice of the 
newsreader comes from far away, like a blue floating balloon. I have no 
hold on it because it floats away, leaving me with itchy skin. (How Can i 
talk 114)
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  Here, too, Mukhopadhyay keeps but sorry guard of meaning, though in the 
context of trying to manage his concern for the miners, which is clearly over-
whelming. At first, the auditory stimuli register as a visual and then as an olfac-
tory tableau. Once he has the analogy of the boiling starch and the related smell 
of burning rice, his account can begin to move. The addition of the ants, another 
analogical entity, allows him to connect the frothing starch to his itchy skin. It is 
as if he were crossing a creek, stone by associative stone; call it narrative by other 
means. A final analogy—the blue, floating balloon—conveys the breakdown of 
ordinary consciousness, including the loss of receptive language. With exquisite 
skill, Mukhopadhyay captures what psychologists call emotional contagion: his 
concern for the miners bubbles over the brim of its natural container, spills, then 
completely incapacitates him—to the extent that he loses track of all distinctions 
and boundaries. Once again, his body is the site of narrative development, but it 
is also the measure of his extraordinary solicitude.
LZ: It seems to me that, though coming from a different field (i.e., disability studies), 
you are, in fact, doing precisely the kind of work that cognitive approaches to 
literature, at their best, are meant to do, that is, bring together cognitive science 
and literary studies in ways that transform both disciplines instead of merely ap-
plying insights from cognitive sciences to literary criticism. If cognitive scientists 
currently committed to the “mindblindness” paradigm will listen to a researcher 
such as yourself, versed both in cognitive science and literary criticism, what 
you say may have a very real impact. Also, speaking of real impact, I know that 
you’ve been thinking about establishing an arts program for students with sig-
nificant disabilities. How might such a program affect entrenched assumptions 
about disability?
RJS: If cognitive science frequently overemphasizes the deterministic effects of hu-
man physiology, then disability studies frequently overemphasizes the deter-
ministic effects of human culture. The former corrects for a kind of material 
obliviousness; the latter, for a kind of haughty reductionism. When it comes to 
embodied literary endeavors, I don’t favor the rigid “application” of either. What 
is needed is exactly what you propose: a transformation of both disciplines. 
Without such a transformation, the concept of neurodiversity risks becoming, 
on the one hand, just a derided form of political correctness (what newscaster 
Diane Sawyer, after interviewing an autistic self-advocate, dismissively called “a 
beautiful way of justifying heartbreak”) and, on the other, just a liberal shibbo-
leth, where cognitive difference is paradoxically managed, even brushed aside, 
by superficial respect. From forms of life come forms of writing and reading—let 
us devote ourselves unhierarchically to this proposition.
  I am trying to establish a program for young people with significant disabili-
ties that foregrounds the relationship between difference and creativity. Alter-
native forms of embodiment can produce alternative epistemologies and even 
potential aesthetic advantages. The idea would be to give a population that is dra-
matically under-represented in higher education (not to mention the workforce) 
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a chance to develop a particular craft. The program would affirm disabled dif-
ference precisely by showing how it might be exploited to think and to create in 
new ways. Imagine some very talented young people working with well-known 
disability artists and allies—the result would likely be as salutary for these young 
people as for the culture at large.
  And imagine, with more autistic writers and artists, how the field of cognitive 
aesthetics might evolve by allowing difference to further complicate the normal/
abnormal binary and by discovering the full import of neuroplasticity in both 
the neurotypical and neuroatypical populations. As autistics continue to develop 
a literary tradition, one inexorably entwined with the dominant tradition, only a 
concept like neurocosmopolitanism will be up to the task of fully understanding 
the dynamic, neurocultural habits of different readers and writers.
Endnotes
The authors are grateful to Jim Phelan for his insightful suggestions.
 1. See, for example, Herbert Lindenberger, “Arts and the Brain.”
 2. See E. Savarese, “What We Have to Tell You: A Roundtable with Self-Advocates from the Autism 
National Committee.” Interestingly, a study from 2005 comparing autistics and psychopaths and 
dividing empathy into its component parts appears to confirm Shore’s view. It found that autistics 
struggle with cognitive and motor empathy while psychopaths struggle with emotional empathy. 
However “lower-order” emotional empathy may be, it not only serves as essential fuel for “higher-
order” propositions and bodily enactments, but it also rescues empathy from strictly intellectual 
or performative expressions, as the case of psychopaths makes clear. See Blair, “Responding to the 
Emotions of Others” (2005).
 3. Dawson, M., I. Soulières, M. A. Gernsbacher, L. Mottron. By using the Ravens Progressive Matri-
ces test, which is considered the gold standard of fluid intelligence, instead of the more common 
Wechsler Scale, a very different picture of autistic intelligence emerged.
 4. A study comparing how autistics and non-autistics process high- and low-imagery sentences 
found that the former activated parietal and occipital brain regions for both kinds of sentences 
whereas the latter did so only for the high-imagery ones. (An example of a high-imagery sen-
tence, to which subjects were asked to respond “true” or “false”: “The number eight, when rotated 
90 degrees, looks like a pair of glasses” [2484]). Although the authors interpreted this difference as 
a sign of underconnectivity in autistic brains, there was no difference between the two groups in 
error rate or reaction time. See Kana et al., “Sentence Comprehension in Autism” (2006). It should 
be noted that this study used so called “high-functioning” autistic subjects. Because classical or 
“low-functioning” autistics have great difficulty remaining still, they are rarely, if ever, used in 
neuroimaging studies.
 5. See Zunshine, Strange Concepts 6–14, 63. The same book, unfortunately, still adheres to the domi-
nant view of autism as mindblindness, a view corrected in everything Zunshine has published 
after her first conversation with Ralph James Savarese at MLA in 2012.
 6. See Soma Mukhopadhyay, Understanding autism.
 7. See Biklen 39. See also Dinishak and Akhtar for a related discussion of mindblindness as meta-
phor.
 8. See Gernsbacher and Frymiare.
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 9. In a recent study, sentences containing textual metaphors—“I had a rough day”—activated the 
parietal operculum, a region responsible for sensing texture, whereas literal sentences matched 
for meaning—“I had a bad day”—did not. See Lacey, Stilla, and Sathian. In another study, “neu-
roimaging data support[ed] a greater involvement of sensory (e.g. visual) areas in concrete word 
processing . . . and a more focal activation of perisylvian ‘language’ areas for function words as 
well as abstract nouns” (456). See Martensson et al.
10. Persicke et al. found that “multiple exemplar training is effective for teaching children with autism 
to understand metaphors. Furthermore, generalization to untrained metaphors was found for all 
participants” (913). 
11. For an excellent overview of post-traumatic stress disorder, see Bessel van der Kolk, “Clinical 
Implications” (2006).
12. Biklen is controversial because he has devoted himself to autistics on the so-called low-function-
ing end of the spectrum, claiming that they have none of autism’s typical impairments. He came to 
this conclusion after witnessing a technique called facilitated communication (or supported typ-
ing) enable the most severely autistic to express their thoughts and feelings. Over the last twenty 
years, the technique’s efficacy has been disproven in studies as frequently as it has been proven. 
These mixed results, along with the technique becoming embroiled in the recovered memory 
controversy, have not helped to bring clarity to the nature of classical autism. While the autis-
tics cited in the section on mindblindness once required facilitation, they all learned, after many 
years, to type independently—and still they encounter skepticism. The consensus view, derived 
largely from observed behavior, generalizes about incompetence while Biklen and others general-
ize about potential competence, believing that experts should practice what Anne Donnellan calls 
“the least dangerous assumption.” We really don’t know what the capabilities of classical autistics 
are as a group or just how many individuals might profit from literacy training and occupational 
therapy—the motor impairment in classical autism is so severe that much effort must be extended 
before even semi-independent communication can emerge. Some researchers believe that autism 
may actually be many different disorders that more or less look the same at particular points on 
the spectrum.
13. See <http://aaspire.org/?p=about&c=cbpr>.
14. See Williams, autism and Sensing 117.
15. Here is how a door becomes a door for Mukhopadhyay: “When I enter a new room, which I am 
entering for the first time and look at a door, I recognize it as a door, only after a few stages. The 
first thing I see is its color. If I do not get into a deeper cogitation of its color by defining it as 
‘yellow,’ and mentally lining up all the yellow things I know of, including one of my yellow tennis 
balls when I was seven years old, I move on to the shape of the door. And if I lay my eyes on the 
door hinge, I might get distracted by the functions of the levers. However, I pull my attention 
from there and wonder about the function of that yellow, large rectangular object, with levers 
of the first order, called a hinge. ‘Why is that yellow, large rectangular object with levers there?’ I 
mentally answer the question, ‘It has allowed me to come inside that room, and can be opened or 
closed. And what else can that be, other than a door?’ My labeling is complete. And I move on to 
the next object in the room to find its characteristics, then define and label that object. Does this 
happen for all circumstances? No, when I am used to situations, and have labeled the objects in-
cluded in that situation many times, I do not need to follow these steps” (How Can i talk 94–95).
16. It is important to underscore, in the words of Manning, that “autistic perception is a tendency in 
perception on a continuum with all perception, not a definition of autism. . . . Given the quickness 
of the morphing from the relational field into the objects and subjects of our perceptions, many of 
us neurotypicals feel as though the world is ‘pre-chunked’ into species, into bodies and individu-
als. This is the shortcoming, as autistics might say, of neurotypical perception (that we are simply 
too quick to chunk)” (218–19).
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17. Mukhopadhyay’s most recent book of poems, i am Not a Poet, But i Write Poetry, contains three 
villanelles and a number of pantoums. The villanelles can be seen here: <http://dsq-sds.org/ 
article/view/1192/1256> (T. Mukhopadhyay, “Five Poems”).
18. Researchers, for example, have shown that the perception of metrical stress activates our motor 
systems (Aleman and Van’t Wout). See Starr: “As parts of the brain . . . that coordinate motion are 
also recruited by metrical writing, it makes all the more sense that poems may make us wish to 
keep time, move and imagine motion” (280).
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